The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement

Recalling the United Arab Emirates Consensus in its entirety, across mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation,

Noting decision -/CP.31,[1]

I. Global progress and context

1. *Strongly reaffirms* its commitment to multilateralism and *resolves* to remain united in the pursuit of efforts to implement the Convention and achieve the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement;

2. *Recalls* that the Paris Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances;

3. *Acknowledges* that the Paris Agreement is working, that the global transition towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development is irreversible, and that significant collective progress towards the Paris Agreement temperature goal has been made, from an expected global temperature increase of more than 4 °C according to some projections prior to the adoption of the Agreement to an increase of around 2.6°C based on the full implementation of the current national climate plans;

4. *Emphasizes* the importance of promoting the economic and social benefits and opportunities of action on climate change, recognizing the significant drop in the cost of mature renewable energy and zero- and low-emission technologies, and the role of the energy transition in strengthening energy security, affordability and availability;

5. *Commends* the 167 Parties that had communicated their new nationally determined contributions, the 81 Parties that had communicated long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies, and the 96 Parties that had submitted their national adaptation plans as at 18 November 2026, and *urges* Parties that have not yet communicated such contributions or strategies or submitted such plans to do so as soon as possible;

6. *Welcomes* the ongoing implementation of the enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement as at 17 November 2026, including the submissions of 140 first biennial transparency reports, the completion of 112 technical expert reviews, the participation of 80 Parties in facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress and the 2026 synthesis report on the first biennial transparency reports;[2]

7. *Encourages* Parties that have not yet submitted their first biennial transparency report to do so as soon as possible and *invites* all Parties to submit on time their biennial transparency reports due by 31 December 2026, taking into consideration paragraph 4 of decision 18/CMA.1;

8. *Encourages* enhanced support for the implementation of national adaptation plans and *urges* Parties to implement the United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience and to mainstream climate change adaptation in all relevant national plans and strategies, taking into account national circumstances and priorities;

9. *Reaffirms* the Paris Agreement temperature goal of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature

[1] Draft decision entitled "X" proposed under agenda item 2(f) of the Conference of the Parties at its thirty-first session.
[2] Available on https://unfccc.int/2026-Synthesis-Report-of-Biennial-Transparency-Reports

increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;

10. *Underscores* that the risks and impacts of climate change will be much lower at the temperature increase of 1.5 °C compared with 2 °C;

11. *Expresses deep concern* that peak global warming is expected to exceed 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels in the next few years;

12. *Recognizes* that 1.5 °C overshoot and every increment of warming above current levels will increase the frequency and intensity of loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change and result in increasingly adverse, and in some cases irreversible, impacts and risks to human and natural systems;

13. *Reaffirms* its resolve to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C to limit both the magnitude and duration of any temperature overshoot, *recognizes* the need for deep, rapid and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in line with 1.5 °C pathways and *resolves* to close adaptation gaps and enhance action and support to enable countries and communities to better avert, prepare for, adapt to, respond to and recover from adverse climate impacts;

14. *Recognizes* the urgency of enhancing action and support in relation to adaptation, means of implementation and mitigation for addressing gaps in the implementation of the Paris Agreement as a whole;

15. *Recalls with concern* the pre-2020 gaps in both the mitigation ambition and implementation of developed country Parties and that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change had previously indicated that developed countries must reduce emissions by 25–40 per cent below the 1990 level by 2020, which was not achieved;

16. *Also recalls with concern* that the carbon budget consistent with achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal is now small and being rapidly depleted and *acknowledges* that historical cumulative net carbon dioxide emissions account for at least four fifths of the total carbon budget for a 50 per cent probability of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C;

17. *Encourages* Parties to accelerate the full implementation of nationally determined contributions while striving to do better collectively and cooperatively in the light of national circumstances, recognizing that developed countries should take the lead;

18. *Recalls* Article 4, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement, which states that support shall be provided to developing country Parties for the implementation of Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, in accordance with Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Paris Agreement, recognizing that enhanced support for developing country Parties will allow for higher ambition in their actions;

19. *Highlights* that the costed needs of developing country Parties as reported in their nationally determined contributions are estimated at USD 5.1–6.8 trillion for up until 2030 or USD 455–584 billion per year[3] and that adaptation finance needs are estimated at USD 305 billion annually for up until 2035[4] and *notes with concern* the gap between climate finance flows and needs, particularly for adaptation in developing country Parties;[5]

20. *Recalls* paragraph 36 of decision 1/CMA.7, in which Parties were invited to develop implementation and investment plans for their nationally determined contributions and to align their nationally determined contributions with their broader economic development strategies and plans;

21. *Expresses deep concern* that the adverse impacts of climate change are increasing in frequency and severity, and will continue to do so with every increment of warming, with far-reaching consequences for people, livelihoods, food security and ecosystems, including the ocean, mountains and the cryosphere, and *expresses concern* regarding the ongoing El Niño event, against the backdrop of the observed warming trend, increasing climate and weather and extremes;

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[3] See document FCCC/CP/2024/6/Add.2−FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/8/Add.2.

[4] See United Nations Environment Programme. 2026. *Adaptation Gap Report 2026: Ready? Not*. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme. Available at https://www.unep.org/en/publications/report/adaptation-gap-report-2026.

[5] Standing Committee on Finance. 2026. *Seventh Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows*. Bonn: UNFCCC. Available at https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/resources/biennialassessment-and-overview-of-climate-finance-flows.

22. *Recognizes* the growing impacts of climate change on health, and *underscores* the need to strengthen climate-resilient health systems through the integration of health considerations into national adaptation plans and other relevant processes;

23. *Recognizes* the vulnerability of mountain regions, ecosystems and glacier-dependent communities to the adverse effects of climate change, and *decides* to establish a two-year Work Programme on Mountains and Climate Change under the Subsidiary Body for the Implementation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, using the relevant existing workstreams and agenda items, with a view to enhancing adaptation action, disaster risk reduction, resilience-building, data observations and early warning systems, using support through existing channels and building on existing work under the Convention and the Paris Agreement;

24. *Requests* the Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to convene XX Mountains and Climate Change Dialogues at SBSTA 66 (June 2027) and SBSTA 68 (June 2028), with a view to elevating scientific understanding and awareness of the impacts of climate change on mountain regions, ecosystems and glacier-dependent communities, and *further requests* the Chair of the SBSTA to prepare, with the support of the secretariat, a report upon the conclusion of XX Mountains and Climate Change Dialogues, make it available to CMA 10; and *decides* that a high-level dialogue on mountains and climate change is to be convened at COP 32 under the guidance of the COP 32 Presidency;

25. *Also decides* to hold a high-level dialogue at the ninth session of the CMA focused on scientific findings around 1.5°C overshoot, its implications, and the complementarity between equity, science and sustainable development and the urgency of action and support, and *further requests* the Chair of the Subsidiary Body of Scientific and Technological Advice to prepare, with the support of the Secretariat, a report upon the conclusion of the dialogue for presentation at Research Dialogue held in conjunction with the subsequent SBSTA session;

26. *Recognizes* that systematic observation underpins early warning systems and the assessment of collective progress towards achievement of the Paris Agreement temperature goal, *expresses concern* regarding threats to the continuity and sustainability of long-term observational records and networks, both in situ and satellite, of the Earth system, including as a result of declining support for the Global Climate Observing System and the Global Ocean Observing System, and *encourages* enhanced support for addressing persistent monitoring gaps in under-observed regions, including through the Systematic Observations Financing Facility;

II. Accelerating implementation

A. Concrete solutions

27. *Recognizes* that end-to-end multi-hazard early warning systems are among the most effective solutions for saving lives, strengthening adaptation and resilience, and reducing loss and damage;

28. *Recalls* the call of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, made on World Meteorological Day on 23 March 2022, to ensure universal coverage of early warning systems for all people on Earth by 2027, *recognizes* the contribution of the Early Warnings for All initiative towards achieving this goal and *notes with concern* that significant gaps in coverage remain, as well as the need to sustain and accelerate efforts until universal coverage is achieved;

29. *Recognizes* that electrification has significant benefits in terms of emission reductions, energy security, energy efficiency, economic development and energy access and *underlines* that universal access to clean, reliable, affordable and sustainable energy, clean cooking facilities and means of implementation, including for developing country Parties, can help realize those benefits;

30. *Also recognizes* that the contribution of electrification to the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement is maximized with the greatest possible use of clean energy, recognizing that countries will take different pathways and solutions in accordance with their national circumstances and development priorities;

31. *Further recognizes* that reductions in anthropogenic methane and other non-carbon-dioxide emissions contribute to limiting the magnitude of peak warming, taking into consideration the fundamental priorities of safeguarding food security, livelihoods and respecting different cultural practices and national circumstances;

32. *Expresses deep concern* about the impacts of climate change on the ocean, livelihoods, food security, and biodiversity, including as a result of ocean warming and sea level rise, and *recognizes* the important contribution of sustainable ocean-based climate action to strengthening adaptation and resilience and advancing mitigation efforts while delivering benefits for communities and biodiversity;

33. *Recognizes* the need to enhance means of implementation and support for sustained global ocean observing and early warning systems, and for enhanced access to ocean data and technologies and capacity-building;

34. *Also recognizes* nature-based solutions and ecosystem-based approaches as essential climate solutions that can contribute simultaneously to mitigation, adaptation and resilience, including through the conservation, protection, restoration and sustainable management of forests and other natural ecosystems;

35. *Emphasizes* the importance of nature, forests, the ocean and other ecosystems as natural infrastructure for resilience and *recognizes* that they play a critical role as sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases, as well as their importance in the context of overshoot, including for supporting biodiversity and food security and helping communities adapt to climate impacts;

36. *Welcomes* efforts to urgently and rapidly scale up the research and development, dissemination and deployment of carbon dioxide removal technologies and approaches, recognizing that these have a role, as assessed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in achieving the Paris Agreement long-term temperature goal, but should complement, and not substitute or delay, deep emission reductions, and *stresses* that its deployment should ensure environmental safeguards, and respect the rights of Indigenous Peoples;

37. *Recognizes* the importance of resource efficiency, sustainable consumption and production, waste reduction and circular economy, and efforts on zero waste as important elements of climate action, in accordance with national circumstances and priorities;

38. *Calls* for the full and expeditious implementation of nationally determined contributions and national adaptation plans, informed by the outcome of the first global stocktake, as set out in decision 1/CMA.5, across mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation;

39. *Affirms* its commitment to accelerating implementation of, support for and cooperation in climate action, in a manner aligned with the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, as informed by the best available science, reflecting equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances, and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty;

40. *Calls for* global cooperation across all actors to strengthen implementation, finance, investment, technology development and transfer, and capacity building for concrete solutions to accelerate the irreversible global transition towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate resilience, and to keep 1.5 degrees within reach, recognizing that countries will take different pathways and solutions in accordance with their national circumstances and development priorities, including through, inter alia:

(a) Strengthening and expanding end-to-end multi-hazard early warning systems linked to early action, and delivering on the Early Warnings for All initiative and the 2027 goal for universal coverage referred to in paragraph 28 above, including in all least developed countries and small island developing States, and accelerating efforts until universal coverage is achieved;

(b) Strengthening climate risk monitoring, forecasting, preparedness, anticipatory action, pre-arranged finance, shock-responsive social protection and adaptation planning and readiness;

(c) Accelerating, in line with national circumstances, the uptake of clean, secure, affordable, accessible and resilient energy systems, including through the accelerated development, deployment and diffusion of renewable energy and other zero- and low-carbon energy technologies and fuels, energy efficiency technologies, and accelerated expansion, modernization and improved resilience of electricity grids, and transmission and distribution networks;

(d) Increasing the share of electricity in total final energy consumption to 35 per cent globally by 2035, alongside efforts to, inter alia, increase clean energy, improve energy efficiency, and enhance deployment of other low emission technologies, alongside enhancing storage, system flexibility and modern and resilient grids, and improving energy access;

(e) In the context of paragraph 31 above, adopting the use of cost-effective technological solutions, as available, that reduce emission of non-carbon dioxide gasses, including anthropogenic methane;

(f) Strengthening and accelerating the implementation of sustainable ocean-based action in national climate plans, including, but not limited to, Nationally Determined Contributions and National Adaptation Plans, in a nationally determined manner;

(g) Encouraging enhanced efforts to halt and reverse deforestation and forest degradation by 2030;

(h) Accelerating Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage deployment with an aim to achieve gigatonne scale globally by 2035 as a collective global aspiration, and encouraging all actors, including industry, to scale up research and development recognizing the role of CCUS, particularly in hard to abate sectors;

41. *Encourages* ecosystem-based adaptation and integrated adaptation efforts to strengthen resilience to the adverse effects of climate change, including through sustainable land management, ecosystem restoration and drought-resilient livelihoods, supported by finance, technology development and transfer and capacity-building;

42. *Resolves* to scale up international cooperation and support for the development and implementation of national adaptation plans, including for locally led adaptation that is participatory and responsive to local contexts, knowledge and needs;

43. *Recognizes* the important role of domestic energy planning, capacity-building, policy strategies and frameworks, as well as cooperation between different levels of government, in creating enabling environments to expand electrification and use of sustainable fuels and attracting financing for energy transitions;

44. *Emphasizes* that just transition pathways can enable accelerated climate action, in this critical decade and beyond, based on equity and the best available science, and *highlights* the contribution of just transitions to more robust and equitable mitigation and adaptation outcomes;

B. Enabling action, including through means of implementation

45. *Underscores* its commitment to the effective implementation of the new collective quantified goal on climate finance and the call for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 in the context of decision 1/CMA.6, including paragraph 16, and *resolves* to accelerate delivery thereof;

46. *Recalls* Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement, according to which developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention;

47. *Underscores* the critical importance of support provided and mobilized by developed country Parties for facilitating enhanced ambition and implementation of mitigation and adaptation by developing country Parties;

48. *Recalls* that other Parties are encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily;

49. *Reiterates* the importance of reforming the multilateral financial architecture and *underscores* the need to remove barriers and address disenablers faced by developing country Parties in accessing finance for climate action, including high costs of capital, limited fiscal space and high transaction costs;

50. *Expresses concern* regarding the increasing adaptation impacts of climate change and the rising costs of adaptation and *stresses* the urgent need for the scaled-up provision and mobilization of adequate, predictable, public, grant-based and highly concessional finance for adaptation in developing country Parties, in particular for the least developed countries and small island developing States;

51. *Recalls* paragraph 53 of decision 1/CMA.7 and *requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to prepare for consideration by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its ninth session (November 2027) a technical report identifying options in relation to the baseline for the call for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 in the context of decision 1/CMA.6 and to include in the report referred to in paragraph 30 of decision 1/CMA.6 information on the progress of such efforts;

52. *Agrees* to discuss, under the work programme on climate finance referred to in paragraphs 54–55 of decision 1/CMA.7, an implementation pathway for tripling adaptation finance by 2035 that responds to and accelerates delivery of efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 in the context of decision 1/CMA.6 for consideration by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its ninth session;

53. *Decides* to launch, under the guidance of the Presidencies of the eighth and ninth (November 2027) sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, in consultation with Parties, the Antalya–Addis Ababa road map on adaptation and resilience finance, aiming to promote predictable and scaled-up finance for adaptation, including innovative sources, and mechanisms for access thereto, in the context of decision 1/CMA.6 and paragraphs 54–55 of decision 1/CMA.7, and *requests* the Presidencies to produce a report summarizing the conclusions of the work under the road map for consideration by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its ninth session;

54. *Reaffirms* paragraph 16 of decision 1/CMA.6, including with regard to pursing efforts to at least triple annual outflows from the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, the Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund based on 2022 levels by 2030 at the latest, and acknowledges that replenishments and contributions to these funds are an important element in pursuit of these effort.

55. *Recalling* the importance of the provision of climate finance, in a timely, adequate and predictable manner, to developing countries, and *recognizing* the importance of multilateral climate funds having ambitious replenishments and contributions, including for financing at scale and supporting increase in outflows, with a view to achieving a progression over time;

(a) *Underlines* the importance of an ambitious third replenishment of the Green Climate Fund, and *urges* developed country Parties to provide financial resources for the third replenishment of the Green Climate Fund, and encourages the Green Climate Fund to actively reach out to potential contributors;

(b) *Notes* the initial pledges announced to date towards the ninth replenishment of the GEF Trust Fund, notes with concern the decline of the resources allocated to GEF-9 compared to GEF-8, including the percentage share allocated to the climate change mitigation focal area, and encourages further ambitious pledges to the GEF-9 replenishment;

(c) *Recognizes* the importance of ensuring the long-term sustainability of the Adaptation Fund, Least Developed Countries Fund and Special Climate Change Fund and encourages contributions, including through multi-year pledging arrangements;

56. *Encourages* the boards of these funds to consider the priorities and needs of developing countries, in their activities, in accordance with their mandates;

57. *Recognizes* that improved, efficient and equitable access to climate finance is essential to support implementation, including through the measures outlined in the new collective quantified goal on climate finance, *acknowledges* the progress of multilateral development banks and multilateral climate funds in improving access to finance and *encourages* the taking into account of country-led programming and ensuring of the meaningful engagement of vulnerable communities and groups, and different national circumstances and capacity constraints of developing countries in the provision and mobilization of climate finance;

58. *Also encourages* the provision of enhanced readiness support, institutional capacity-building support and technical assistance to developing country Parties for strengthening their national financial institutions, including national and public development banks and other entities seeking direct access to climate finance, and *invites* the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, the Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund, bilateral climate finance providers and multilateral development banks, upon request and in a country-driven manner, to support funded project preparation and capacity-building. within their respective mandates;

59. *Also invites* the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, the Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund, and multilateral development banks and other international financial institutions to improve access by taking measures to simplify and expedite funding approval and disbursement procedures, such as mutual recognition of accreditation across funds, readiness and project preparation support that extends beyond the preparation of strategies and pipelines to support implementation, flexible co-financing approaches for small island developing States and the least developed countries and other measures to reduce transaction costs, and taking

measures to enhance transparency of efforts taken in this regard, as appropriate, with a view to improving access for developing country Parties, in particular for the least developed countries and small island developing States;

60. *Requests* the secretariat, in collaboration with multilateral development banks and multilateral climate funds, including the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, the Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund, to organize annual workshops, to be held from 2027 to 2030, to facilitate the exchange of information on efforts, progress and next steps in relation to enhancing access to climate finance, and with a view to supporting the meaningful engagement of Parties, and *also requests* the secretariat to prepare technical reports on these workshops as inputs to the biennial report by the Standing Committee on Finance on the implementation of decision 1/CMA.6 and as inputs to the special assessment of access to climate finance referred to in paragraph 34 of decision 1/CMA.6;

61. *Decides* the Subsidiary Body on Implementation will develop terms of reference for the special assessment of access to climate finance, as referred in para 34 of decision 1/CMA.6, by its seventieth session for consideration at the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its eleventh session, ahead of the special assessment of access undertaken at its twelfth session.

62. *Welcomes* the progress in operationalizing the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage and stresses the importance of enhancing collaboration, coordination, complementarity and coherence across funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change and strengthening their respective mandates to deliver support, technical assistance and responses to the growing and priorities of vulnerable developing countries;

63. *Recognizes* the importance of adequate and predictable resources for the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage and *encourages* continued efforts to scale up the Fund's resources, consistently with its Governing Instrument;

64. *Takes note* of the 21 per cent increase in climate finance from multilateral development banks over the prior year in view of reaching their 2030 climate finance estimates, announced during the twenty-ninth session of the Conference of the Parties, of delivering USD 120 billion per year and mobilizing a further USD 65 billion in private capital;

65. *Recalls* Article 13, paragraphs 14–15, of the Paris Agreement and *acknowledges* the important role of support for reporting, and the building of transparency-related capacity, in the ongoing implementation of the enhanced transparency framework;

66. *Emphasizes* the importance of Parties and actors in the international financial architecture implementing policies, plans, measures and actions that mobilize public, private, bilateral, multilateral and alternative sources of finance for developing country Parties in such a manner as to support climate-resilient development, and enhance developing country Parties' capacity to attract and absorb climate finance, reduce cost of capital, optimize the use of grant-based and concessional finance and crowd in private investment;

67. *Reaffirms* the long-term goal of making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development;

68. *Recognizes* the role of the private sector, *highlights* the need to strengthen relevant policy guidance, incentives, regulations and enabling conditions to reach the scale of investments required to achieve a global transition towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development and *encourages* Parties to continue enhancing their enabling environments;

C. International cooperation and collaboration

69. *Underlines* the urgent need to address, in a comprehensive and synergetic manner, the interlinked global crises of climate change, biodiversity loss, desertification, and land and ocean degradation in the broader context of achieving sustainable development;

70. *Invites* the co-facilitators of the ocean and climate change dialogue for the biennium 2027–2028 to develop the "Antalya Ocean Current", a multi-year plan for future dialogues, taking into account the ambition cycle of the Paris Agreement with a view to supporting continuity between dialogue sessions, identifying entry points for ocean-based climate action across relevant UNFCCC processes and

enhancing uptake of the key messages emerging from the dialogues, and *invites* Parties and non-Party stakeholders to submit via the submission portal[6] views on such a multi-year approach, with updates on progress to be delivered through the dialogue;

71. *Recalls* paragraph 180 of decision 1/CMA.5 and *invites* the co-facilitators of the ocean and climate change dialogue, with the assistance of the secretariat, to develop the "Blue Imece" synthesis report, to be made available by March 2028 as an input to the second global stocktake, drawing on, as appropriate, but not limited to:

(a) Voluntary submissions from Parties on their priorities, progress and challenges in implementing the sustainable ocean-based climate action included in their latest nationally determined contributions, long-term strategies and adaptation communications, as relevant;

(b) The best available science on climate change impacts on the ocean and the contributions of sustainable ocean-based climate action to mitigation and adaptation;

72. *Encourages* relevant work programmes and constituted bodies to strengthen the integration of ocean-based climate action within their existing mandates and workplans and to report on progress of relevant activities, including as related to the key messages in the ocean and climate change dialogue informal summary reports, as appropriate;

73. *Notes* the views regarding measures that may have cross-border impacts, particularly for developing countries;

74. *Reaffirms* that Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them to better address climate change, and *also reaffirms* that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade;

75. *Recognizes* that international trade can promote innovation and sustainable economic growth and development, support effective, equitable, cooperative and inclusive climate action, and create opportunities for value addition, diversification and participation in low-emission value chains;

76. *Welcomes* the convening of the first dialogue on trade and climate change at the sixty-fourth sessions of the subsidiary bodies and *encourages* continued engagement at the next two such dialogues of parties and stakeholders, including relevant international organizations: such as the World Trade Organization, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the International Trade Centre;

77. *Recalls* the understanding reached at this session with regard to the dialogues on trade and climate change outlined in the draft report on the eighth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement[7] in 2026, as recalled by Chairs of the subsidiary bodies at their respective sessions,[8] and *requests* the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies, with the assistance of the secretariat, to produce summary reports referred therein summarizing the discussions held during the next two dialogues on trade and climate change to be orally presented at the subsequent sessions of the subsidiary bodies;

78. *Also invites* Parties, at their discretion, to share relevant information relating to the potential cross-border effects of climate measures at the dialogues on trade and climate change;

79. *Encourages* engagement in the high-level event referred to in paragraph 56 of decision 1/CMA.7 relating to the dialogues on trade and climate change;

80. *Recognizes* the disproportionate impacts of climate change on children and the importance of Parties and relevant actors strengthening children's access to essential services through climate-resilient systems and infrastructure for health, education, nutrition, protection, and water and sanitation, and reducing climate-related risks, *invites* relevant constituted bodies and work programmes to integrate relevant aspects of the impacts and responses within their existing mandates, *reaffirms* the important role of children and youth as agents of change in addressing and responding to climate change and their meaningful engagement in climate action;

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[6] https://submissions.unfccc.int.

[7] FCCC/CP/2026/XX, paragraph reference.

[8] FCCC/SBI/2026/XX, paragraph reference.

81. *Notes* paragraph X of decision x/CP.31, in which the Conference of the Parties stresses that effective climate action requires inclusive, participatory and gender-responsive implementation, including the full, meaningful and equal participation and leadership of all women and girls, and urges Parties and all relevant actors to advance implementation of the Belém gender action plan for 2026–2031, adopted in decision 7/CP.30

82. *Acknowledges* the role and contributions of Indigenous Peoples and of local communities in relation to nature stewardship and climate leadership, as well as the disproportionate effects of climate change on Indigenous Peoples and on local communities, *recognizes* the importance of the rights of Indigenous Peoples in accordance with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and *urges* Parties to actively involve Indigenous Peoples and local communities in the design and implementation of climate action;

83. *Encourages* Parties, in accordance with their national circumstances and priorities, to strengthen multilevel arrangements with local and regional governments for the implementation of their climate action;

84. *Recognizes* the central role of equity and the best available science for effective climate action and policymaking, and of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, whose assessment reports are the most robust and comprehensive assessment of climate science, as part of the effective implementation of the Convention and the Paris Agreement;

85. *Highlights* the importance of the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change for the global stocktake, *expresses appreciation and gratitude* to those involved in preparing the reports that comprise the Seventh Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change for their contributions, *invites* the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to continue to provide policy-relevant information as input to the UNFCCC processes, including outputs from the seventh assessment cycle to the next global stocktake and *looks forward* to the conclusion of relevant discussions within the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change with a view to it providing additional clarity on its programme of work;

86. *Welcomes* the launch of the second global stocktake as a comprehensive, facilitative, inclusive and Party-driven process, recognizing that it is an integral part of the implementation cycle of the Paris Agreement for assessing collective progress towards its goals, and *encourages* the meaningful participation of non-Party stakeholders in the process;

87. *Welcomes* the ongoing efforts of the Standing Committee on Finance under its workplan to deliver the mandated reports for 2028 as early as possible in 2028 and, in this context, invites the Standing Committee on Finance to make available technical reports and data as early as possible so they can serve as inputs to the second Global Stocktake, without prejudice to the work and finalisation of reports by the standing Committee on Finance work and in line with its respective mandates;

88. *Recognizes* the value of a diverse range of knowledge systems and *encourages* further efforts to enhance contributions from all regions, underscoring that such contributions strengthen the robustness and comprehensiveness of scientific assessments;

89. *Also recognizes* the important role and active engagement of non-Party stakeholders, particularly civil society, workers, business, financial institutions, farmers, cities and subnational authorities, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, people of African descent, women, youth and children, and research institutions, in supporting Parties and contributing to the significant collective progress towards the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, and in addressing and responding to climate change and enhancing ambition and implementation with a view to keeping 1.5 °C within reach;

90. *Further recognizes* the increasing complexity and breadth of the UNFCCC process and the need to maintain an inclusive, transparent, predictable, consensus-based, Party-driven process for effectively fulfilling the objective of the Convention and the goals of the Paris Agreement and *resolves* to continue to strengthen the UNFCCC process with a view to fulfilling the objectives of the Convention and the goals of the Paris Agreement;

91. *Requests* the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies to convene a dialogue on the matter referred to in paragraph 90 above during the sixty-seventh (November 2027) and sixty-ninth sessions (November 2028) of the subsidiary bodies, *also requests* the secretariat to prepare a report containing options for strengthening the consensus-based, Party-driven process as an input to the dialogues and *further requests* the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies to prepare a summary report on the dialogues for consideration by the

eleventh session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (November 2029);

92. *Recognizes* the role of voluntary cooperation under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, in the implementation of Parties' nationally determined contributions, in allowing for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions and promoting sustainable development and environmental integrity and transparency, including in governance, and the potential of high-integrity international carbon markets to mobilize investment, accelerate emission reductions and removals and contribute to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and *encourages* the secretariat, including through its regional collaboration centres, to continue providing technical assistance and capacity-building to developing country Parties for the implementation of Article 6, paragraphs 2, 4 and 8, of the Paris Agreement;

93. *Requests* the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to consider initiating, at its sixty-sixth session, the first review and update, as appropriate, of the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement,[9] as referred to in paragraph 2 of decision 18/CMA.1;

94. *Notes with appreciation* the report on its seventh session[10] and the report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirtieth session[11] as well as the report on its eighth session[12] and the report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirty-first session.[13]

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[9] Decision 18/CMA.1, annex.
[10] FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/19.
[11] FCCC/CP/2025/12.
[12] Reference and link to CMA 8 report.
[13] Reference and link to COP 31 report.